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As winter descended on Washington in December 1878, the Forty-fifth
Congress gathered for what promised to be a hectic third and final ses-
sion. Emotions ran high. In this era, Congress habitually reserved much
of its business for these brief, intense “lame duck” sessions that fell
between the election of legislators in November and the adjournment of
Congress the following March. Compounding the usual sense of urgency
was the startling result of the recent election: the Democratic party had
gained control of the Senate and, when the next Congress convened,
would control both the Senate and the House for the first time since
before the Civil War. Senate Republicans well understood that they had
but a few precious months to close ranks and enact legislation on some
of the burning issues of the day: civil rights, the currency, the tariff. Yet
when the session opened, none of these issues made their way to the
floor. Instead, and despite howls of protest from senators eager to move
on to what they plainly regarded as more urgent concerns, the Senate
assembled on many afternoons for several weeks to debate a completely
different matter: a proposed law concerning the rights of inventors. At
this critical juncture in American politics, the Senate found itself
embroiled in a long and complex discussion of the virtues and deficien-
cies of the patent system.1
How do we explain it? Perhaps the episode was merely a diversionary
tactic orchestrated by one of the Senate’s competing factions to forestall
legislation on more pressing matters. Such an explanation would fit
neatly with the scholarly consensus that the nineteenth-century American
government was a mere “state of courts and parties” that lacked the tools
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to respond effectively to the complex issues spawned by rapid economic
development. It would be equally congenial to the many historical
accounts that deny that the nineteenth-century United States even had a
state, or that posit that its governmental institutions merely “responded”
to changes set in motion by industrialism, a social process presumed to
be largely independent of and unrelated to public policy. Both of these
interpretations characterize the nineteenth-century Congress as an essen-
tially reactive body balkanized by rival political factions and dominated by
party leaders intent on protecting the personal fiefdoms that they had
carved out through the judicious disbursement of government contracts
and jobs (known as “spoils”). Incapable of enacting constructive legisla-
tion, party leaders did all they could to block those who tried. Public pol-
icy, as a consequence, lacked coherence, and was little more than the sum
total of the particularistic decisions of legislators and judges. Parties ran
election campaigns and distributed spoils; courts sorted out the mess. In
all matters involving economic regulation, the courts reigned supreme.
Since party leaders were preoccupied with placating their supporters,
while the federal government lacked effective administrative agencies, it
was left to the courts to broker the inevitable disputes that industrialism
spawned.2
In certain respects, congressional debate over the regulation of the
patent system fits into the “courts and parties” framework. The bill’s
chief opponent was a consummate spoilsman; the bill failed; and the con-
test shifted to the courts. The senator who kept the issue on the floor was
none other than New York’s Roscoe Conkling, the flamboyant leader of
a faction of the Republican party known as the “stalwarts” in tribute to
their fierce allegiance to ex-President Ulysses S. Grant. Stalwarts had long
maintained their influence through the judicious disbursement of polit-
ical patronage, especially in the pivotal state of New York. In 1878, how-
ever, Grant was out of office and the stalwarts’ influence was waning.
Predictably, Conkling’s role in the patent debate was obstructionist:
rather than seeking legislation of his own, he sought to kill a bill that
someone else had proposed.
Conkling’s challengers included ascendant Democrats, Republican
rivals such as the anti-Grant faction headed up by presidential hopeful
James G. Blaine, and—most threatening of all—an insurgent group of
Republican legislators known as “liberals,” and sometimes termed by his-
torians the “liberal reformers.” It was the liberals, led by Bainbridge
Wadleigh of New Hampshire, in combination with certain like-minded
Democrats, who had introduced the patent bill and shepherded it
through the House and Senate committees on patents. Liberals sought
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not only a new patent law but also lower tariffs and civil service exami-
nations—all measures that Conkling and the stalwarts vociferously
opposed. Although the patent bill would ultimately pass the Senate,
Conkling and his allies tied it up in debate long enough to prevent the
Senate bill from being reconciled with a companion bill in the House.
Frustrated at Conkling’s obstructionism, supporters of patent legislation
gave up on Congress and sought redress in the courts.
In two important respects, the congressional debate over patent
reform diverged from the “courts-and-parties” framework in which it
might otherwise seem to fit. For one thing, the debate over patent law did
address a key issue in nineteenth-century political economy—namely, the
appropriate role of government in shaping the course of technical
change. This was precisely the kind of issue that the Senate was presumed
to avoid. For another, the debate did revolve around an administrative
agency—the U.S. patent office—that wielded an impressive degree of
bureaucratic autonomy.
Patent policy resonated with powerfully felt ideologies and tapped
into strongly felt beliefs. Patents were exclusive privileges that the federal
government granted to certain individuals for a limited period of time,
and, like all monopoly grants, their regulation raised some of the most
fundamental questions of the age. The monopoly issue confronted every
branch of nineteenth-century American government as well as every juris-
diction: federal, state, and local. In essence, the issue boiled down to two
interrelated questions: Did the government have the authority to regulate
the monopolies it had created? And, if so, how?
The liberal argument for patent reform cast an unusually bright light
on the monopoly issue. This was because it tried to strike a balance
between two very different kinds of government-sanctioned monopolies:
the federally granted patents held by individual inventors, and the state-
granted charters held by the emergent industrial corporations. The lib-
eral argument for patent reform sought to solve a perplexing puzzle: How
might the federal government best foster the widespread adoption of
technological innovation in an age that was increasingly dominated by
giant corporations? At a time when the potential of technological inno-
vation seemed almost boundless, such a puzzle could not help but stimu-
late a wide-ranging debate not only in Congress but also in the wider
society.3
The ramifications of the patent issue were practical as well as ideo-
logical. At its core, it posed a special challenge for two groups of eco-
nomic actors, namely, farmers and railroads, who were often at odds not
only with Congress but also with each other. Both groups felt besieged by
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lawsuits filed by avaricious patent agents—popularly known as “patent
sharks”—who demanded, often successfully, sizable payments for the
infringement of patents that patent agents controlled.
The root cause of the predicament facing farmers and railroads lay
in the new kinds of economic opportunity hastened by the recent trans-
formation of the country’s economic institutions. Since the early repub-
lic, the center of gravity for economic activity had shifted from the
Atlantic seaboard, where it had been coordinated by a relatively tight-knit
community of merchants active in overseas trade, to the vast North
American interior, where its protagonists included the large and sprawl-
ing mass of farmers, miners, shippers, and railroad managers who
extracted and shipped agricultural and mineral wealth. This new eco-
nomic order was not only much larger geographically than the economic
order it supplanted; it was also far more dependent on large-scale busi-
ness enterprise—including, in particular, the railroad. Its origins were
political as well as economic. Among its catalysts were the U.S. victory in
the U.S.-Mexico War of 1846–48, which enormously increased the size of
the country, and the military mobilization of the Union army in the Civil
War, which hastened the elaboration of state-spanning enterprises in
transportation, manufacturing, and mining.4
The new economic order put an enormous strain on many govern-
mental institutions, including the patent system. Farmers and miners
often lived far from the federal courts that enforced patent decisions,
while railroad managers and shippers coordinated enterprises much
larger than those for which the patent system had been designed. The
highly concentrated railroad industry, in which a few large corporations
exerted a powerful influence, distorted the market mechanisms that the
designers of the patent system had presumed to be integral to its opera-
tion. Patent holders and railroad managers alike complained that it was
impossible to rely on the market to determine a fair price for patented
inventions. To complicate matters still further, the expanding economy
had generated a surge in patent activity that swamped the patent office,
significantly increasing the success rate of would-be patent holders.5
To bring the patent system into alignment with these recent changes,
various groups lobbied to alter what we would today call “intellectual
property law.” Their principal targets were federal patent law and the fed-
eral court doctrines that defined rights of inventors. Taken together,
these initiatives were known as patent reform. In a pattern that would
eventually become ubiquitous—but that in the 1870s remained relatively
rare—this reform movement was spearheaded by functionally specialized
interest groups: for the farmers, the National Grange; for the railroads,
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trade groups such as the Eastern and Western Railroad Associations,
which employed patent attorneys who mounted a legal defense for the
entire railroad industry. Both groups lobbied Congress directly to secure
favorable legislation on an issue that was for them of vital concern.6
To understand the congressional patent debate that engaged the Senate
in December 1878, it is useful to know something about the history of
the patent system. The patent system had long been a governmental insti-
tution: enshrined in the Constitution, it was older than the country
itself. Before the War of Independence, the patent system had been coor-
dinated by Great Britain; after the war, certain provisions of English law
found their way into article 1, section 8 of the federal Constitution. In
this section, Congress was empowered to “promote the progress of sci-
ence and the useful arts” by “securing for limited times to authors and
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”
This section became the foundation for the law of copyright and patents.
In the first federal Congress, Congress defined the “limited times” for
which an inventor could secure an exclusive grant to be fourteen years,
and assigned responsibility for the administration of the patent system to
a commission that consisted of the vice president, the chief justice, and
the secretary of state, with the secretary of state as the administrator. The
first secretary of state, Thomas Jefferson, took his administrative respon-
sibility quite seriously. Jefferson reviewed each patent application per-
sonally and issued patents sparingly. The magnitude of this challenge
taxed even Jefferson’s formidable intellect. Not surprisingly, his succes-
sors followed the path of least resistance: instead of evaluating each appli-
cation on its merits, they merely registered it, granted it a patent, and left
its interpretation to the courts. In the early republic, the courts became a
forum for a series of celebrated patent disputes involving such landmark
inventions as the automated flour mill, the cotton gin, the steamboat,
and the telegraph. Not all inventors fared well under this system. Yet, to
an extent that is often forgotten, it was the courts—and, in particular, the
federal courts—that determined who would be the eponymous inventors
of some of the most notable inventions of the age, including the cotton
gin (Eli Whitney) and the electric telegraph (Samuel F. B. Morse).7
The registry method persisted without major revision until 1836, when
Congress significantly altered the procedures involved in obtaining a patent.
In that year, Congress established a new administrative agency—the patent
office—and a new senior federal administrator—the commissioner of
patents. Henceforth, the commissioner and his staff of examiners evaluated
every patent application closely to determine if it was technically novel and
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sufficiently distinct from patents the patent office had already assigned. To
facilitate the pre-approval process, the office required inventors to submit a
technical drawing and a three-dimensional model. Should the review prove
successful, the model would go on public display in the halls of the patent
office’s stately new main building in Washington, D.C.
This new procedure greatly increased the prominence of the patent
system as a locus of innovation. Although the courts retained the ulti-
mate authority to determine the precise meaning of a patent, the pre-
approval review erected a gate between the inventor and the legal system
that significantly increased the value of those applications that squeezed
through. Successful patent applications received the imprimatur of the
federal government—investing them with a moral authority far greater
than any pre-1836 patents enjoyed. Patents now became, as it were, not
only a form of property (for they had been that before 1836), but a form
of property that a federal administrative agency had certified—and that,
by implication, the federal government had a special obligation to pro-
tect. The value of those patents that passed the test was further enhanced
by the fact that no other major industrial country conducted such a strin-
gent pre-approval review. The post-1836 patent system, informed
observers agreed, was a distinctively American achievement, and one that
deserved much credit for the celebrated inventiveness of the American
people. When the eminent British scientist William Thomson—following
a visit to the Centennial Exhibition in Philadelphia in 1876, at which he
admired the fruits of American technical ingenuity—urged the British
government to emulate the United States patent office and institute a
pre-approval review, supporters of the patent system gleefully voiced their
satisfaction. Thomson had confirmed their most fundamental belief.8
While the pre-approval review distinguished the U.S. patent system
from its counterparts in Europe, its exclusively federal character distin-
guished it from most other regulatory arenas in the United States.
Federalism was perhaps the single most distinctive governmental institu-
tion in nineteenth-century America. In most regulatory arenas, the man-
date of the federal government remained strictly limited, with the states
retaining broad decision-making powers.9 In the patent system, however,
the federal government was preeminent: state governments played no role
in its administration, while state courts played only a small, and, as time
passed, increasingly circumscribed role in its regulation.
While Congress was responsible for establishing the general prin-
ciples guiding the patent system, it played little role in its routine
administration. Congress did have the right to grant patent holders
seven-year extensions of their rights, should they be able to demonstrate
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that unusual circumstances had prevented them from securing a com-
mensurate financial reward during the fourteen-year period of their ini-
tial grant. Yet only rarely, and in highly unusual circumstances, did
congressmen evaluate the merits of a particular patent. As a conse-
quence, after 1836 the patent system acquired a bureaucratic momen-
tum, and its administrators a measure of bureaucratic autonomy, that
distinguished it from most other federal governmental institutions,
with the notable exceptions of the postal system and the military.10 The
bureaucratic momentum of the patent office was sustained not only by
the patent commissioner but also by the patent examiners, a new class
of federal administrators created by the 1836 law. Within a few years,
patent examiners would become well versed in highly technical matters
and arcane legal principles, while the patent commissioner would
become something of a political entrepreneur who publicized the activ-
ities of the patent system and lobbied Congress on its behalf.
The principal constraint on the bureaucratic autonomy of the patent
office was the size of its budget. Each year the patent commissioner pro-
posed a budget for Congress to consider. In the period between 1836 and
the Civil War, this proposal often sparked sharp debate. Commissioners
routinely urged Congress to increase the number of examiners, while
Congress typically balked—approving at most a smaller increase than the
commissioner had requested.
The staffing debate might at first glance seem to involve little more
than the inevitable give-and-take of administrative politics. Salaries, after
all, were the largest item in the patent office budget. Yet the principal
point of contention was not the cost to the federal government of the
salaries it paid to the patent commissioner and his staff. As the patent
commissioner regularly reminded Congress, the fees that patent appli-
cants generated more than covered this cost. Rather, the crux of the mat-
ter was the relationship between the size of the patent office staff and the
likelihood that a would-be patent holder could secure a patent. All things
being equal, the larger the number of examiners, the more rigorous the
pre-approval review process—and the more likely a given application
would be denied. By keeping the number of patent examiners small,
Congress could, as it were, shift the patent system back toward the 
registry model that had prevailed before 1836.11
A further constraint on the bureaucratic autonomy of the patent
office was the congressional mandate that patent commissioners devote
part of their annual surplus to an ongoing program of agricultural
research. In response to this mandate, patent commissioners included a
section in their annual reports on crop yields and recent improvements
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in agricultural practice, neither of which had anything to do with the
patenting of inventions. Patent commissioners grumbled about the finan-
cial drain this research program posed: they would have preferred to use
funds to hire more patent examiners. Yet the program endured, and even
expanded over time, presumably because it mollified congressmen from
farm districts who, in its absence, might have lobbied for the abolition of
the patent system as a subsidy for American industry. In the time-hon-
ored tradition of American politics, the inability of one constituency to
eliminate a subsidy program did not preclude it from securing another
subsidy for itself.12
The agricultural research program, like the granting of patents, was
predicated on the belief that intellectual endeavor would foster material
benefits. Yet it differed from the patent process in one fundamental
respect. Patents benefited particular individuals; the agricultural reports
did not. Although the reports were intended to have commercial value,
their benefits were not restricted to a particular farmer; on the contrary,
they were presumed to be widely shared. Agricultural research was a 
collective endeavor that its advocates hailed as the very antithesis of
monopoly. The granting of a patent, in contrast, invested specific indi-
viduals with exclusive property rights and legal privileges in the expecta-
tion that, by pursuing their own self-interest in a competitive market, they
would make the fruits of their labors accessible to the general population.
Farmers were by no means the only group of Americans to have prob-
lems with the patent system. Equally dissatisfied, though often for dif-
ferent reasons, were the managers of the country’s burgeoning railroad
network. Railroads were prodigious users of technology. Railroad man-
agers routinely assembled complex ensembles of equipment from dis-
parate sources, while railroad employees often deployed devices and
procedures that they themselves had designed. For the most part, rail-
road managers neither encouraged their employees to patent inventions
nor endeavored to generate profits by controlling patented inventions.
Only rarely did a railroad try to secure a competitive advantage by
assembling a patent portfolio, as would, for example, the telegraph com-
panies that strung wires along their routes. Instead, railroads competed
by securing lucrative rights-of-way from state legislatures and by devel-
oping the surrounding territory. This reluctance of railroads to profit
from patented inventions can be explained neither by the absence of
competition in the railroad industry nor by any principled aversion to
government assistance. In the nineteenth century, competition between
railroads was often intense, and railroad promoters were highly adept at
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securing government-granted privileges: state legislatures, for example,
regularly guaranteed them a monopoly over a particular right-of-way,
and almost invariably limited their financial liability in the case of loss.
Yet, with few exceptions, railroad managers chose not to secure patent
rights for the myriad technical improvements that they and their
employees devised.
The hesitance of railroad managers to seek patent protection reveals
much about the character of technical change in the industry. In the
nineteenth century, the railroad industry was so dynamic that railroad
managers assumed they would profit more from the open exchange of
technical information than they would by securing exclusive rights to spe-
cific inventions. Railroad managers diverged from this policy only in
those relatively rare instances when they believed that a particular patent
would enable them to establish an ancillary business along their right-of-
way. In the 1860s, for example, the managers of the Pennsylvania
Railroad took advantage of their controlling interest in several lucrative
steelmaking patents to build a number of large steelworks along a route
that they served.13
While railroad managers displayed a limited interest in patents, sup-
pliers of railroad technology sought them out with an avidity unmatched
in most other industries. In 1852, the patent office devised a separate cat-
egory for inventions designed specifically for railroading. By the end of
the Civil War, the number of railroad-specific patents had increased from
fifty per year to more than five hundred.14 Railroads also used numerous
patentable devices and procedures that were not specific to the railroad,
and that ranged from paints, lubricants, and building materials to pumps,
office machinery, and electrical equipment.
The avidity with which suppliers courted the railroads was in no way
surprising. Railroads were an excellent market. Large and complex, they
relied on a prodigious variety of technical equipment, which they often
purchased in bulk. In addition, and in contrast to many other industries,
this equipment was often in plain view. For railroad suppliers, this posed
a dual advantage. Not only did it provide many opportunities to discover
room for improvement, but it also made it relatively easy to determine if
one of their patents had been infringed.
Despite these lures, suppliers of patented equipment faced significant
challenges in plying the railroad trade. Outsiders often had trouble 
gaining access to the tracks and equipment necessary to test and refine
their inventions. When independent inventors and other suppliers did
come up with something new, they encountered a technically savvy cus-
tomer with formidable technical capabilities that had been honed by the
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operational demands of maintaining a far-flung network of locomotives,
cars, and equipment. Many railroads operated their own machine shops
and foundries and could easily manufacture much of the equipment that
they purchased from suppliers. Indeed, many railroad-specific patents had
originated as inventions devised by the employees who worked in these
facilities. Not surprisingly, railroad managers tended to assume that the
solutions their employers devised to operational problems would become
part of the industry’s generic stock of technical knowledge. The sheer
number of railroad-specific patents confronted suppliers with a still-fur-
ther challenge. If railroad managers detected a conflict between two
patented inventions, they might refuse to purchase either one, confident
that they could fend off an infringement suit by contending that the own-
ership of the product or process in question remained in dispute.
So long as the territory railroads embraced remained small and the
organizational complexity of their equipment limited, the potential
costs of patent infringement suits remained low. By the 1860s, however,
several railroads—in the East, the Pennsylvania, the Baltimore & Ohio,
and the New York Central; in the West, the principal lines running west
and south from Chicago—had become so geographically extensive and
the scale of their operations so complex that the potential costs sud-
denly grew much larger. Such vast integrated enterprises were far more
vulnerable to patent infringement lawsuits than their smaller and less
complex predecessors. Should a patent holder persuade a court that he
deserved to receive a financial award from a railroad that had infringed
on his patented invention, the patent holder might well be able to
secure a large settlement—since the settlement would be based on the
number of pieces of equipment on which the patented invention had
been used. As railroads expanded, the potential for a large settlement
increased, and patent infringement suits multiplied. Typically, they
involved devices and procedures that railroad managers assumed had
either become generic or that were covered by patents for which they
had paid a nominal fee.
The most celebrated patent infringement suits involved inventions
known as “double-acting” brakes. By the 1860s double-acting brakes had
been adopted by railroads throughout the country. Double-acting brakes
greatly simplified the routine operations of a train by permitting a brake-
man to apply brakes on both ends of a railroad car by turning a single
wheel. The technique reduced labor costs and, according to some,
extended the life of the railroad cars’ wheels. No single prototype existed.
The very lack of uniformity in railroad practice provided an opening for
Thomas Sayles, an enterprising patent agent who acquired the rights to
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three different kinds of double-acting brake. In effect, Sayles tried to create
a single, comprehensive composite invention whose rights he controlled.
Each variant in this composite had been patented between 1849 and 1852,
and one had been reissued in 1853, long before the railroads had
expanded to their present dimensions. Nonetheless, Sayles claimed, each
of his patents embraced an indispensable element of any double-acting
brake, while any railroad that used such a brake—which, by the 1860s,
meant almost every railroad in the country—had either to pay him a licens-
ing fee or risk a lawsuit for patent infringement.
Sayles’s audacity caught railroad managers unawares. To compound
their woes, they soon received a major setback in the courts. In Sayles 
v. Chicago and Northwestern Railway Company (1871), a federal court case
adjudicated in Chicago, Judge Thomas Drummond awarded Sayles dam-
ages in a railroad patent infringement suit on the basis of a recently artic-
ulated legal doctrine known as the “doctrine of savings.” Prior to this
time, courts had customarily required infringers to pay patent holders
three times the patent holders’ ordinary license fee. Under certain cir-
cumstances, however—or so several courts had recently ruled—it was
impossible to determine just what a fair price for a patent would be. Not
surprisingly, many of these cases involved railroads: after all, it was here,
in a technically complex and rapidly expanding industry dominated by
large corporations, that it was becoming increasingly difficult to rely on
market criteria to value assets.15 In such a situation, or so Drummond
and several of his colleagues on the federal bench decreed, infringers
would henceforth be liable to pay patent holders three times the savings
they had derived from the use of a patented invention. In the case of
Sayles’s double-acting brake, attorneys for Sayles pressed Drummond to
accept their calculation that the savings railroads had obtained by using
Sayles’s patent amounted to $455 per railroad car per year. If this total
were multiplied to include every railroad car that might be found guilty
of infringing on Sayles’s patent, the total liability confronting the railroad
industry—or so one railroad patent lawyer estimated—would total $45 
million, an enormous sum.16 Although Drummond responded by lower-
ing the per-car total, the total liability for an individual railroad of mod-
est size remained well over $40,000. Larger lines operating more cars and
infringing for longer periods would pay far more.
Sayles, of course, was but one patent holder. What might happen,
railroad managers brooded, should other patent holders institute similar
suits? Compounding their unease was their recognition that, in similar
cases, the courts had ruled that the doctrine of savings applied not only
when the infringing enterprise had lost money in its overall business
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operations but also when a money-making enterprise had proven in court
that the patented invention had not been worth the investment.17
Potential cost-saving technologies such as double-acting brakes were
but one class of patented inventions that confounded railroad managers.
Equally daunting was the challenge posed by inventions designed to
improve railroad safety. Many of these devices replaced human input with
some kind of automatic mechanism. For example, an automatic signal
might be activated by the tripping of an electric circuit embedded in a
railroad track, eliminating the need for a signalman. An automatic brake,
similarly, might be configured to operate independently of the interven-
tion of a brakeman. For various reasons, railroad managers showed little
enthusiasm for such novelties and generally resisted public clamor to
experiment with them. The public had a right to railroad safety, they pro-
claimed, but not to dictate to the railroads how they ought best to attain
it.18
In the changing political climate of the postwar period, the man-
agers’ intransigence grew increasingly untenable. To improve railroad
safety, several states and municipalities enacted ordinances requiring rail-
roads to fence their lines, slow down in congested areas, stop at crossings,
and install in their locomotives fire-preventing spark arrestors. State rail-
road commissions, originally established primarily to monitor railroad
finance, soon turned their attention to the hazards railroads posed.19 In
response to the public outcry that followed a deadly railroad accident in
Revere, Massachusetts, in 1871, Massachusetts railroad commissioner
Charles Francis Adams Jr. issued two widely circulated reports on rail-
road safety. The first was directed primarily at industry insiders and
stressed the importance of careful planning and the strict enforcement of
rules. The second was intended for the railroad-traveling public and
included a discussion of such technical fixes as automatic brakes and
automatic signals. To determine which worked best, Adams went so far as
to promise that the Massachusetts railroad commission would supervise
experimental trials.20
Among the greatest beneficiaries of Adams’s publicity campaign
was George Westinghouse Jr., a young inventor who had devised an
automatic braking system that used compressed air. Hardly anyone
doubted that Westinghouse’s air brake could stop a train faster and
more reliably than almost any other product on the market. Yet before
Adams had issued his second report, only a few railroad managers had
placed substantial orders for the devices, and many of those had acted
only at the urging of disgruntled passengers. Adams’s reports, and the
ensuing government-sponsored trials, were a boon for Westinghouse.
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The public clamor for air brakes became intense, and legislation man-
dating their installation was seriously debated not only in several states
but also in Congress. Seizing the moment, Westinghouse negotiated
lucrative air-brake contracts with several large railroads, and sued others
for patent infringement.
Westinghouse’s conduct deeply troubled Adams. His reports, he
now came to see, had encouraged state legislatures to consider legislation
that would, in effect, have granted Westinghouse a lucrative monopoly
over an entire class of railroad equipment. To remedy his mistake, Adams
and certain railroad managers desperate to circumvent Westinghouse laid
plans for a new series of trials intended to showcase promising alterna-
tives to Westinghouse’s air brake—such as a brake occupied by vacuum.
To the chagrin of Adams and the railroads, Westinghouse promptly pur-
chased the patents that covered the vacuum principle. Before long,
Westinghouse would also add to his patent portfolio automatic signaling.
Westinghouse’s rapid ascendancy convinced railroad managers of
their extreme vulnerability to patent holders with inventions that capi-
talized on new commercial opportunities that the railroads had done so
much to create. To make matters worse, Westinghouse was not alone.
Sleeping-car mogul George Pullman, for example, parlayed a portfolio of
equipment patents into a popular service—the sleeping car—that railroad
passengers came to demand. In an age in which it had become possible
to travel thousands of miles by railroad, one could make a good deal of
money by providing specialized services for those passengers who had the
means and the desire to travel in predictable comfort and style.
Meatpackers similarly took advantage of their patents on refrigerator car
design to bring dressed meat to consumers in widely dispersed urban
markets, in the process depriving railroads of a lucrative business in ship-
ping livestock. While neither Pullman nor the meatpackers benefited as
directly from government-generated publicity as had Westinghouse, they
too found a sympathetic forum in the courts, which repeatedly voided all
attempts by state and local interests to prevent them from operating on a
nationwide scale.21
Taken together, the doctrine of savings and the emergence of ambi-
tious, nationally oriented inventor-entrepreneurs such as Westinghouse
and Pullman put railroad managers in an unenviable position. Were
present trends to continue, or so they feared, it seemed likely that the
returns on technical innovation in their industry would flow primarily
to outsiders. Cost savings derived from productivity-enhancing innova-
tions would pass to patent holders under the doctrine of savings, while
innovations that increased safety, enhanced comfort, or provided new
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kinds of services would reap large profits for outsiders like Westinghouse
and Pullman. Committed to preventing the patent system from throt-
tling their industry, railroad managers turned to Congress—one of the
few forums with the necessary authority to grant them relief.
Railroad managers harassed by patent infringement lawsuits first
approached Congress in early 1874. Working through industry-wide trade
associations that they had established to defend themselves against patent
agents, they lobbied to block Congress from exercising its authority to
extend Sayles’s patents. To their surprise, they found support from an
unexpected quarter. For reasons unrelated to the railroad managers’ spe-
cific grievance—yet that followed directly from the transformation in the
scale of economic activity that the railroad had done so much to foster—
the issuance of patent extensions had found its way onto the national
political agenda.
Patent extensions emerged as a national issue in 1872, when
Congress extended a patent for a sewing machine that had originally been
granted many years earlier to Elias Howe. This legislative grant enabled
the Singer Sewing Machine Company (which controlled Howe’s patent)
to stifle its competitors while it built its own nationwide marketing net-
work. Although convenient for Singer, the extension outraged the thou-
sands of farmers who had joined together to form the National Grange.
Grangers despised Singer. Most bought their sewing machines from
Montgomery Ward, a mail-order house that had established a large fol-
lowing among farmers by working through Grange-sponsored coopera-
tives. Montgomery Ward received a substantial percentage of its revenue
from the sale of “knock off” sewing machines, which it sold for roughly
half Singer’s price. To the Grangers, the price differential between a
Singer sewing machine and a Montgomery Ward sewing machine neatly
symbolized the oppressive tax patent monopolists extracted from farmers.
As the 1874 congressional campaign season heated up, Grangers made
opposition to the Singer patent-extention bill a key test of political loyalty.
Grange leaders urged their members to defeat any congressman who had
supported the bill.22 Fearing the worst, chastened members of the House
committee on patents rejected virtually every new application for patent
extensions, including Sayles’s. Sayles, they reasoned, had already
obtained an adequate return on his investment, having collected 
substantial damages from his victory in Chicago.
Buoyed by Sayles’s defeat, patent attorneys employed by railroad
trade associations drafted a model bill to curb the doctrine of savings and
limit the financial awards that patent holders could secure from infringers.
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To ensure its enactment, these novice lobbyists hoped to tap resentment
toward the patent system among Grangers, who, or so they assumed, had
sufficient political clout to secure whatever patent legislation they desired.
This was a tricky strategy, since the Grangers also disliked the railroads—
whom they accused of charging unduly high and unfairly discriminatory
rates to ship agricultural staples. Well aware of the Grangers’ distrust, rail-
road attorneys lobbying on behalf of the proposed legislation took partic-
ular pains to conceal their role in the bill’s formulation.
For a time it looked as if the railroad lobbyists might prevail. The
1874 congressional elections had bolstered the Grangers’ political clout
by restoring control of the House to the Democrats, a party sympathetic
to farmer concerns. In the following session, emboldened farmers
flooded Congress with complaints about “patent sharks” who threatened
them with lawsuits for the unauthorized use of such ubiquitous devices
as the swing gate and the driven well. A patent for the latter claimed to
cover the principle of tapping an underground water source by driving a
pipe into the ground. To the outrage of thousands of farmers and ranch-
ers in the arid Southwest, patent agents had swarmed into the region
warning gate and well users that, if they wished to avoid paying fifty-dol-
lar license fees, they must travel to St. Louis to defend themselves in
court. The southwesterners’ outrage at the patent agents’ audacity was
compounded when it became known that the patent office had originally
assigned the well patent to a Union army officer who claimed to have
invented it while on active duty during the Civil War. Even staunch
Unionists wondered why they should have to pay for the rights to an
invention that had been devised in wartime by a federal employee.
Railroad lobbyists counted on farmer outrage to help them slip their
bill through Congress. Although they prevailed in the House, they failed
in the Senate, where the bill died. The bill’s defeat—or so contended a
member of the House committee on patents, in an assertion that went
unchallenged—had been ensured by the backstage maneuvering of “a sin-
gle senator,” presumably Roscoe Conkling.23
As railroad attorneys hatched plans to reopen the patent issue dur-
ing the following session, they found the political landscape decisively
transformed. When they had originally introduced the patent bill, even
careful students of federal patent policy—such as, for example, the editors
of Scientific American—had associated it not with the railroads, but,
instead, with the Grangers. By the summer of 1877, the cat was out of the
bag. Exposed by Scientific American as the handiwork of covetous corpo-
rations, the patent bill had drawn the attention of wary congressmen,
who insisted that, prior to it coming up for a vote, it be substantially
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revised and subjected to extensive public hearings conducted by patent
committees in both the House and the Senate.24
The subsequent hearings, which took place in the winter of
1877–78, posed for railroad lobbyists a major challenge. Here they con-
fronted not only lawyers representing their primary antagonists—Sayles,
Westinghouse, and Pullman—but also the Grangers, who, while still
fiercely hostile to the patent system, objected strenuously to the omission
from the proposed legislation of an “innocent purchaser” provision
exempting from legal action anyone who had unwittingly infringed a
patent. The phrase “innocent purchaser” touched for many a sensitive
nerve—since it had recently been deployed, in a quite different context, by
federal courts in the South and West to block state governments from
voiding fraudulent railroad bond issues on the rationale that these gov-
ernments had an obligation to protect the “innocent purchaser” of the
bonds. Farm groups did not understand why this principle could not be
extended to patents, and had sponsored several “innocent purchaser”
patent bills that had been passed by the House.25
Challenged by patent holders and rebuffed by farmers, railroad lob-
byists turned for support to congressmen who considered themselves lib-
eral in the nineteenth-century sense of opposing big government and
supporting market competition.26 Often dubbed “liberal reformers” to
underscore their commitment to constructive legislative change, these
congressmen opposed the kind of radical attack on the patent system that
farm groups had mounted. Yet in no sense were they merely reactionary
defenders of the status quo. On the contrary, liberals hoped to recast the
patent system to bring it into better balance with the emergent corporate
order. The sponsor of the railroad lobbyists’ bill, Bainbridge Wadleigh of
New Hampshire, belonged to this group, as did most of its supporters in
the Senate. To help make their case, Wadleigh and his allies put railroad
lobbyists in touch with like-minded patent lawyers. Prominent among
them was Chauncey Smith, a highly successful Cambridge, Massachusetts-
based attorney with extensive experience in patent litigation. Smith and
his fellow patent lawyers, most of whom hailed from New England (a
region that boasted many corporations reliant on patented inventions),
redrafted the patent bill and generated friendly testimony on its behalf,
which Wadleigh and his Senate allies then drew heavily upon in making
the case for reform.
The liberals’ argument for patent reform hinged on their probing
analysis of the relationship of invention to innovation in an economy
increasingly characterized by large and geographically extensive corpo-
rations. Where, they asked, was the locus of innovation? And who
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should enjoy its fruits? Even in the early days of the patent system,
Wadleigh explained, inventors never captured all the savings that their
inventions had generated. In fact, inventors had always received only a
portion of their return, with the rest flowing to users. Should inven-
tors try to capture the entire return, they would find it necessary to
charge for the use of their inventions such an exorbitant price that they
would never find a buyer. “In the introduction of inventions to the
public use,” or so Chauncey Smith informed the Senate committee, in
sustaining Wadleigh’s argument, “the case rarely if ever, occurs where
an inventor is able to place in his own pocket any considerable amount
of the value which the community derives from his invention.”
Accordingly, any statute or legal decision that presupposed such an
outcome must “involve in some way some lurking fallacy.”27 Here, in a
single phrase, was the essence of the liberals’ argument.
The challenge of rewarding inventive activity was particularly vexed,
the liberals explained, by the fact that in many industries—such as the rail-
roads—technical change almost always involved far more than the one-
time purchase of a patented device in the open market. Here, for
example, a great deal of technical change took place independently of the
patent system, in the ordinary course of operating the business. To ham-
mer home this point, liberals relied heavily on the evidence that the rail-
road patent attorneys had presented in their congressional testimony. “All
inventions run in lines,” one attorney-cum-lobbyist lectured the Senate
committee, in a brief tutorial on the nature of technical change: “There
is a certain progress and steady improvement in all the arts, and . . . not
by virtue of the patent law exclusively. These lines of invention are what
is called ‘the art.’”28
Such arguments persuaded the liberals that at least some railroad
employees were at least as creative (since they were well versed in the
“art”) as the independent inventors that the patent system had been
established to encourage. “In the army of inventions that are presented to
the railroad companies,” one railroad attorney explained, the patent
holder had “simply the broad seal of the United States in his hands”
while taking it for granted that the railroad itself would “manufacture
and introduce the article.”29 To be useful, inventions had to be integrated
into a complex array of technical devices and operating procedures, many
of which had been devised not by patent holders but, rather, by their
users—that is, the railroads. Surely, then, the enterprises that used such
inventions should be given some of the credit for creating the conditions
that brought them into use. In short, when courts equated the complex
process of innovation with the simple act of invention, they exaggerated
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the contribution of the outside inventor and slighted the creativity of the
company deploying the device or procedure. In so doing, they lost sight
of the basic rationale for patent infringement cases, which was not to
embolden patent holders to extort fantastically large sums from corpora-
tions but to prevent infringers from securing the financial rewards that
were the inventors’ rightful due.
The railroads’ argument proved persuasive to many congressmen,
including Wadleigh. It was nothing short of outrageous, Wadleigh con-
tended, for an amateur independent inventor brandishing a sketchily
drawn patent claim to hold hostage a legion of technically trained
experts. The original design covered by one of Sayles’s patents for double-
acting brakes, Wadleigh observed, was a “very simple one indeed”—and,
he believed, had been proven in court to have been devised by “several
workmen in railroad shops” who “did not apply for a patent” and had put
it into use on their railroad before anyone else.30
Other advocates of patent reform made a related, yet distinct, argu-
ment about more technically distinctive inventions, such as the
Westinghouse air brake. Without denying that Westinghouse’s invention
was, in fact, original to Westinghouse, one railroad representative won-
dered why Westinghouse should be granted a monopoly that exempted
him from the competition that characterized all “other branches of trade.”
“Why should we be obliged to buy any power brake of Westinghouse,” the
representative asked rhetorically:
and, in order to be able to protect the lives and property of the peo-
ple, pay them $150 for what it costs them $10 or $12 to make in
the first instance, and then be obliged to buy every part that wears
out, whether the piston or the rubber tube, from the manufactory
of the patentee, and pay him a like profit? . . . I say it is an outrage,
and that so far from receiving such profits upon the manufactur-
ing, they ought to receive a reasonable patent royalty, and be sub-
ject to the competition in manufacturing that characterizes all
other branches of trade.31
The liberals’ argument inverted the traditional relationship between
the inventor of a novel product or process and its users. Traditionally,
inventors were progressive benefactors and users reactionary monopo-
lists. For the liberals, in contrast, the users of patented inventions were
the progressive benefactors who rendered them accessible to the general
population, while inventors were selfish monopolists fully prepared to
withhold the fruits of invention from the general population should it
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prove impossible to extort a king’s ransom for their use. “The great evil
of our society now”—lamented Representative Stephen Hurlbut of
Illinois, in an astute summary of the case for patent reform that linked it
to a broader cultural concern about the changing meaning of work—“is
this undue and unsound desire, which amounts to a mania among the
people, to grow suddenly rich without work. I think that the present
patent law as it is administered—not in the law itself, but as it is adminis-
tered—tends to create that appetite, and foster that gambling spirit. I
think it holds out the same temptation in the instances of these enor-
mous profits, that have been made from time to time, that are held out
by the lottery.”32
The liberal critique of the patent law did not go unopposed. Among
the liberals’ most determined foes were New York Senator Roscoe
Conkling and a small group of like-minded senators, which included
Maryland senator William D. Whyte and Illinois senator David Davis.
On the patent issue, Conkling and his allies were bound together less by
their admiration for ex-president Ulysses S. Grant than by their long-
standing engagement with patent law. Whyte had served as a defense
attorney in an influential case that helped established the doctrine of sav-
ings. Davis, a former Supreme Court justice, had taken part in many lead-
ing patent cases in his years on the bench, and had long cultivated a
reputation as a champion of farmers and other independent proprietors.
Conkling himself was a seasoned patent lawyer who had recently
defended two manufacturers in major infringement suits.33
This group’s opposition to patent reform drew on a distinctive blend
of judicial reasoning and ideologically charged political rhetoric that
many found compelling in an age in which corporations had yet to
acquire the moral legitimacy that proprietors—then and now—could take
for granted. Why, Conkling asked, was it impossible to calculate the 
savings that an invention might bring certain users, such as a railroad or
a large manufacturer, but not to others, such as a village blacksmith?
How, Conkling asked precisely, did these two kinds of enterprise differ?
To drive his point home, Conkling proposed an array of hypothetical
examples in which users had incorporated patented inventions and
goaded Wadleigh to explain why the doctrine of savings did or did not
apply. Why did a state-spanning railroad that incorporated a patented
invention into a locomotive deserve relief when a village blacksmith who
relied on a patented alloy to harden his metal or who unwittingly
installed a patented axle in a wagon did not?
Supporters of patent reform rebuffed Conkling’s assault by empha-
sizing that, under the proposed law, blacksmiths and farmers would
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enjoy, in at least certain circumstances, the same privileges as railroads.
Undaunted, Conkling raised the rhetorical stakes by assailing the corpo-
rations that had supported the bill. “The bill is objectionable,” Conkling
declared, because it carved out a protection not for the “innocent” and
the “defenseless,” but rather for “exactly those persons who do not need
it”: “It is an exemption of aggregated capital, of powerful combinations,
of intelligent persons from a rule of law which in the same bill we pro-
pose to visit upon the ignorant, the weak, and those who accidentally
become subject to it.”34
Conkling found particularly objectionable those clauses of the pro-
posed legislation that would have excluded railroads and other organized
interests from the doctrine of savings. “Who are excluded?” Conkling
asked sneeringly: “We know not from this bill, but from other information
of which we cannot fail to take notice we do know who the excluded par-
ties are, namely the strong, the rich, the powerful, the owners of aggregated
capital, the great mill-owners, the railway corporations of the country.”35
Conkling’s anticorporate rhetoric was echoed by Illinois senator
Davis. The reformers’ assault on the doctrine of savings, Davis warned,
was rooted less in any desire to render the fruits of innovation more acces-
sible, than it was in the “monopoly power” of patent users—including, of
course, the railroads—whose “concentrated power is sufficient to ruin any
patentee who attempts to bring them to public account.”36
While Conkling and Davis’s rhetoric was unquestionably over-
heated, it would be a mistake to dismiss it as altogether fatuous. On the
contrary, it drew on a highly influential tradition of social thought that
exalted producers and demonized corporations.37 Conkling was hardly a
disinterested bystander; as a patent lawyer, he had long derived a tidy
income from patent infringement suits—and, thus, had a vested interest
in maintaining the status quo. Yet there is good reason to doubt that his
anticorporate animus was insincere. His public pronouncements, for
example, were echoed by his private dealings: even when Conkling was
out of the spotlight, he remained loyal to the time-honored values of the
proprietary capitalism of his youth.38 Conkling’s hostility toward the rail-
road made him somewhat unusual among prominent public figures of
his day. Conkling was, or so railroad magnate Collis Huntington
believed, incorruptible—a view that seems, at least among railroad leaders,
to have been widely shared. Conkling’s archrival James K. Blaine was far
more willing to hasten an accommodation with the emergent corporate
order, especially if there was something in it for himself.39
Conkling’s defense of the existing patent system, in sum, derived less
from the self-interest of a patent lawyer than from a principled allegiance
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to the proprietary values that the patent system had been originally
intended to sustain. From the standpoint of the proprietary capitalist, the
giant railroad corporation was less the harbinger of a new, more techni-
cally progressive age than a Frankenstein’s monster—a mutant that had
grown far larger and more unruly than its government creators had
intended. The true monopolist was not the patent holder, and certainly
not the independent inventor, but these frightening “aggregations of cap-
ital.” Anyone who defended this alien creature, whether a liberal like
Wadleigh or a political rival like Blaine, deserved the most emphatic
rebuke.40 Yet this was as far as Conkling was willing to go. Unlike the
Grangers, Conkling refused to support innocent purchaser provisions
that would have gutted the existing patent system. Like the similar
appeals to repudiate bonds and other financial obligations of govern-
ment, these proposals threatened the property rights that Conkling
deemed essential to proprietary capitalism—rights that he believed the
government had an obligation to defend.
Even before Conkling’s obstructionism killed the proposed patent reform
bill, railroad attorneys who had lobbied Congress had begun to reap div-
idends from an alternative approach that focused on the courts. In
October 1878, in Railway Company v. Sayles, the U.S. Supreme Court ren-
dered its judgment regarding Thomas Sayles’s claims for double-acting
brakes. In his opinion, Justice Joseph P. Bradley refrained from making
any sweeping pronouncements about the possible relevance to the case of
the doctrine of savings; instead, Bradley honed in on the specific details
of the patent claims that Sayles had advanced. In particular, Bradley
denied Sayles’s contention that every double-acting brake system neces-
sarily relied on essential, indispensable principles derived from each of
the three patents that Sayles controlled. On the contrary, Bradley con-
cluded, the patents merely covered three possible solutions to a problem
that had been “in the air” thirty years before, when the original patents
had been issued. Each patent covered a particular arrangement—and
nothing more. Railroads that had obtained rights to the patent that cov-
ered the arrangement they relied on, or that had adopted some other
design, need not fear that they might one day have to pay patent holders
tens of thousands of dollars for infringing on their patents. In this way,
to draw on a concept familiar to students of patent law today, Bradley had
severely restricted the scope of Sayles’s patents.41
Bradley’s ruling in Railway Company v. Sayles was but one of several
in which he advanced an argument that could be plausibly characterized
as pro-railroad. Before Bradley joined the Supreme Court, he had served
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for many years as chief counsel to the Camden and Amboy Railroad, an
enterprise notorious for its artful manipulation of the legal process. And
while on the Court, Bradley had steadfastly rebuffed litigants who sought
legal rulings to relieve state and local legislatures from the obligation to
pay railroad bondholders even in instances in which the original bond
issue had been tainted by fraud.
Yet if Bradley’s railroad rulings are considered in their entirety, a
more nuanced picture emerges. For example, in the landmark case of
Munn v. Illinois (1877), Bradley upheld the constitutionality of state rail-
road regulation—a decision railroad managers vociferously opposed—
while, in various railroad passenger liability cases, Bradley consistently
held up railroads to high standards. It would be equally misleading to
assume that Bradley invariably favored corporate interests in patent dis-
putes. In a famous 1888 telephone patent case, for example, Bradley dis-
sented from Chief Justice Morrison Waite’s monumental decision to
uphold the legality of Alexander Graham Bell’s telephone patents, a deci-
sion that became a cornerstone of the legally sanctioned monopoly of
telephone giant American Bell.42
Bradley’s ruling in Railway Company v. Sayles, like most of his deci-
sions pertaining to business, is best explained not by his supposed pro-
corporate bias but, rather, by his creative engagement with the problem
of monopoly. Relying on distinctions far more supple than those that
Conkling had employed, Bradley articulated in these decisions a theoret-
ically compelling yet empirically grounded critique of monopoly power.
Not only in Munn, but also in the Slaughterhouse Cases (1873), Bradley
based his decisions primarily on his assessment of whether or not the
institution that had become the subject of litigation did or did not enjoy
in practice an exclusive monopoly. Bradley’s rulings in the railroad pas-
senger safety cases, similarly, hinged on his determination that railroad
passengers lacked the alternative means of transit that would have
absolved the carrier from the responsibilities that monopoly power
entailed.43
In reaching his decisions, Bradley took great care to establish the spe-
cific facts involved in each particular situation. A similar sensibility
informed his rulings in patent cases. Determined to balance the rights of
patent holders against those of the public, Bradley immersed himself in
technical detail. If inventors could persuasively establish a solid claim to
distinctiveness and originality, Bradley was willing to interpret their
patent broadly—even if his ruling might cause substantial harm to estab-
lished industries that relied on their invention. But his standards were
strict.44
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The disciplined imagination that informed Bradley’s approach
toward what we would today call patent scope is evident in two of his rul-
ings—both widely cited—that had obvious parallels to his decision in
Railway Company v. Sayles. In Mitchell v. Tilghman (1874), Bradley dissented
from the majority, which had narrowly construed a patent for a method
of obtaining glycerin from animal fat. The glycerin patent, like the
patents for double-acting brakes, dated back to the 1850s; in this case,
however, Bradley ruled against an infringer who claimed his particular
means of obtaining glycerin fell outside the patent.45 When, in Tilghman
v. Proctor (1881), the Supreme Court revisited the glycerin patent,
Bradley’s broad reading prevailed. This decision proved to be a major
financial embarrassment for Procter and Gamble, the nation’s largest
manufacturer of glycerin.46 In a majority decision in Brown v. Selby (1874),
Bradley likewise construed broadly an 1854 patent for a mechanical corn
planter. Here Bradley once again reversed a decision by Judge
Drummond, the judge in the Sayles case; yet, on this occasion, he did so
on precisely the opposite grounds. Drummond had held the corn planter
patent invalid because its inventor had “swelled claims” and had tried to
“lay his hands on the corn planting machine entire.”47 Bradley demurred
in an erudite ruling that was, as legal historian Charles Fairman has
observed, of “extraordinary length” and based entirely on the “factual
details of the case.”48
By grounding so many of his patent decisions in specifics, Bradley
kept patent law relatively unencumbered by abstract principles—such as
the doctrine of savings—that might unintentionally foster the abuse of
monopoly power. Bradley’s method proved influential: not only was he
the author of many of the most important Supreme Court patent deci-
sions, but he won over many of his legal colleagues to the merits of his
approach. In following this course, the federal courts could apply patent
law much more flexibly than could Congress, which must in its legisla-
tion prescribe comprehensive remedies applicable to all cases.
In at least one court ruling, however, Bradley provided a sweeping
justification for the changing locus of innovation in the emerging corpo-
rate order. “The process of development in manufactures,” Bradley
declared in 1883 in Atlantic Works v. Brady,
creates a constant demand for new appliances, which the skill of
the ordinary head-workmen and engineers is generally adequate to
devise, and which, indeed, are the natural and proper outgrowth
of such development. Each step forward prepares the way for the
next, and each is usually taken by spontaneous trials in a hundred
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different places. To grant a single party a monopoly of every slight
advance made, except where the exercise of invention somewhat
above ordinary mechanical or engineering skill is distinctly shown,
is unjust in principle and injurious in its consequences . . .
It was never the object of [the patent] laws to grant a monopoly for
every trifling device, every shadow of a shade of an idea, which
would naturally and spontaneously occur to any skilled mechanic
or operator in the ordinary progress of manufacturers. Such an
indiscriminate creation of exclusive privileges tends rather to
obstruct than to stimulate invention.
It creates a class of speculative schemers, who make it their business
to watch the advancing wave of improvement and gather its foam
in the form of patented monopolies, which enable them to lay a
heavy tax upon the industry of the country without contributing
anything to the real advancement of the art. It embarrasses the hon-
est pursuit of business with fears and apprehensions of concealed
liens and unknown liabilities to law suits and vexatious accountings
for profits made in good faith.49
Interestingly, Bradley’s effusive tribute to the technical virtuosity of
the “ordinary head-workmen”—as well as his conviction that the patent
system had never been intended to grant a monopoly to a “class of spec-
ulative schemers” intent on capitalizing on “every trifling device” and
“every shadow of the shade of an idea”—echoed almost word for word the
arguments that railroad patent attorneys had devised in the double-acting
brake cases and that, in their capacity as lobbyists, they had subsequently
deployed in the congressional hearings on patent reform in 1878–79. Not
surprisingly, railroad leaders were quick to publicize Bradley’s statement;
it was, for example, quoted at length in the 1885 annual report of the
Eastern Railroad Association.50
Bradley’s peroration in Atlantic Works v. Brady tilted the balance to
the railroads in their ongoing struggle to keep independent inventors
and patent holders at bay. Building on Bradley’s ruling, railroad man-
agers worked through trade groups such as the Eastern Railroad
Association to identify technical precedents for patented inventions in
their own shops and facilities. The principle of priority was important
since, in American law, inventors could not rightfully claim a patent for
inventions already in use at the time of their application. Railroad man-
agers also redoubled their efforts to monitor their own inventive activity.
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In addition to prohibiting unauthorized experiments, they discouraged
employees from marketing patented inventions themselves, and required
employees who might have devised patentable inventions to assign their
rights to their employers. Before long, control over railroad technology
passed into the hands of organized bureaucracies that established cen-
tralized testing facilities staffed by experts.51 The age of the independent
inventor was passing; the age of corporate research and development had
begun.52
The challenge railroads posed for the patent system was but one dimen-
sion of a more general phenomenon. Railroads were the harbingers of an
emergent corporate order that was closely bound with the coordination of
complex technical systems. By 1900, analogous technical systems would
come to dominate many industries. For a time in the early twentieth cen-
tury—a period often termed the “Progressive Era”—the regulation of these
technical systems would become a central focus of American politics at
the federal, state, and local level.53 From this period of intense contesta-
tion would emerge the twentieth-century administrative state.54
The organizational capabilities of the twentieth-century state would
have startled lawmakers of Roscoe Conkling’s generation. Yet it would be
a mistake to exaggerate its novelty, for it built on much that had gone
before. The public debate over patent reform in the post–Civil War
decades, both in Congress and the courts, had demonstrated the intel-
lectual earnestness and moral intensity with which contemporaries grap-
pled with the emergent corporate order decades before the rise of big
business would preoccupy lawmakers of the Progressive Era. Indeed it was
the high intellectual caliber with which lawmakers grappled with such
complex issues as patent rights—far more than the often-exaggerated
moral failings of individual politicians—that may well be the most 
distinctive policy legacy of the age.55
The caliber of this debate owed much to the particular social milieu
in which it occurred—a milieu in which the competing moral claims of
proprietary capitalism and corporate capitalism remained in creative ten-
sion. The principal challenge lawmakers confronted was the design of a
regulatory regime that could accommodate both. The solutions they pro-
posed naturally differed in some important respects from those of their
early twentieth-century successors. By the Progressive Era, corporations
had become ubiquitous, and politicians from across a wide spectrum
looked for the federal government to reach some sort of accommodation
with them. In the 1870s, the ranks of reformers were far smaller, and the
relationship of the federal government toward the corporation remained
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far more adversarial, a circumstance that did much to energize public
debate. Why congressmen like Conkling were so unabashed in attacking
corporate power is an intriguing question. At least in part, it was because
corporations remained on the periphery of the more traditional, propri-
etary economic order that continued to account for the bulk of the coun-
try’s economic activity.56
Although legislators and judges dominated the public debate, other
groups loomed large. Patent lawyers, specialized journalists, industry lob-
byists, and the federal administrators who staffed the patent office all
shaped the evolving regulatory regime. The role of the patent office was
particularly notable, not the least because it is so often overlooked. Here
was a bastion of administrative autonomy deep within the federal bureau-
cracy that exerted a subtle yet pervasive influence on public policy. The
patent office anchored the ever-broadening community of experts,
including influential figures in Congress and the courts who interacted
with it as lawmakers and litigants. Among these litigants were the railroad
patent attorneys who, during the congressional patent debate of
1878–79, evolved into some of the nation’s earliest corporate lobbyists.
By floating ideas that would soon be incorporated into proposed legisla-
tion and court decisions, this small yet influential group carved out for
itself a distinctive niche in the policy arena. In so doing, they became an
integral part of the policy process.57 At the vanguard of what we would
today call interest-group politics, these lobbyists—in conjunction with
trade groups such as the Eastern and Western Railroad Associations and
the National Grange—helped not only to shape the political economy of
the late nineteenth century but also to link it with the political economy
of today.
Georgia Institute of Technology
University of Illinois at Chicago
Notes
1. Arguments before the Committees on Patents of the Senate and the House, 45th Cong.,
3d sess., 1878, S. Misc. Doc. 50, serial 1788 (hereafter Arguments).
2. The literature on the late nineteenth-century state is vast. For a brief introduc-
tion, see Richard R. John, “Farewell to the ‘Party Period’: Political Economy in Nineteenth-
Century America,” Journal of Policy History 16: 2 (2004): 117–25. Two useful review essays
are Charles W. Calhoun, “Late Nineteenth-Century Politics Revisited,” History Teacher 27
(May 1994): 325–37, and Calhoun, “Political Economy in the Gilded Age: The Republican
Party’s Industrial Policy,” Journal of Policy History 8 (April 1996): 291–309. For a critique of
the “courts and parties” framework, see John, “Governmental Institutions as Agents of
122 PATENT POLITICS
Change: Rethinking American Political Development in the Early Republic, 1787–1835,”
Studies in American Political Development 11 (Fall 1997): 347–80.
3. On the monopoly problem in nineteenth-century America, see Herbert
Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law, 1836–1937 (Cambridge, Mass., 1991). On the
link between the monopoly problem and patent policy, see Steven W. Usselman, Regulating
Railroad Innovation: Business, Technology, and Politics in America, 1840–1920 (New York,
2002), chap. 4.
4. Usselman, Regulating Railroad Innovation, chap. 1, and James Livingston,
Pragmatism and the Political Economy of Cultural Revolution, 1850–1940 (Chapel Hill, 1994),
chap. 2. See also Alfred D. Chandler Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in
American Business (Cambridge, Mass., 1977), part 2.
5. In 1847, the Patent Office received 1,531 patent applications and issued 572
patents (a 37 percent success rate). In 1871, it received 19,472 patent applications and
issued 13,033 patents (a 67 percent success rate). Report of the Commissioner of Patents, 42d
Cong., 2d sess., 1872, H. Ex. Doc. 86, serial 1511, 8.
6. For a brief but valuable discussion of patent lobbying during the Grant admin-
istration, see Margaret Susan Thompson, The ‘Spider’s Web’: Congress and Lobbying in the Age
of Grant (Ithaca, 1986), esp. 264–70.
7. The nineteenth-century patent system has attracted a great deal of attention.
See, for example, Hugo Meier, “Technology and Democracy, 1800–1860,” Mississippi
Valley Historical Review 43 (March 1957): 618–40; Robert C. Post, Physics, Patents, and
Politics: A Biography of Charles Grafton Page (New York, 1976); Eugene S. Ferguson, Oliver
Evans: Inventive Genius of the American Industrial Revolution (Greenville, Del., 1980), 52–59;
Brooke Hindle, Emulation and Invention (New York, 1981), 16–23 and 42–43; Morgan
Sherwood, “The Origins and Development of the American Patent System,” American
Scientist 71 (September–October 1983): 500–506; Kenneth L. Sokoloff and B. Zorina
Khan, “The Democratization of Invention during Early Industrialization: Evidence from
the United States,” Journal of Economic History 50 (June 1990): 363–78; Carolyn C.
Cooper, Shaping Invention: Thomas Blanchard’s Machinery and Patent Management in
Nineteenth-Century America (New York, 1991); Steven Lubar, “The Transformation of
Antebellum Patent Law,” Technology and Culture 32 (October 1991): 932–59; I. Bernard
Cohen, Science and the Founding Fathers: Science in the Political Thought of Thomas Jefferson,
Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and James Madison (New York, 1995), 237–43; B. Zorina
Khan, “Property Rights and Patent Litigation in Early Nineteenth-Century America,”
Journal of Economic History 55 (March 1995): 58–97; and Khan, The Democratization of
Invention: Patents and Copyrights in American Economic Development, 1790–1920 (Cambridge,
forthcoming).
8. Crosbie Smith and M. Norton Wise, Energy and Empire: A Biographical Study of
Lord Kelvin (New York, 1989).
9. Harry N. Scheiber, “Federalism and the American Economic Order,
1789–1910,” Law and Society Review 10 (1975): 57–118.
10. On the postal system, see Paul Starr, The Creation of the Media: Political Origins of
Modern Communications (New York, 2004), chap. 3, and Richard R. John, Spreading the
News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse (Cambridge, Mass., 1995), esp.
chaps. 1–3. On the military, see Mark R. Wilson, “The Politics of Procurement: Military
Origins of Bureaucratic Autonomy,” in this issue of the Journal of Policy History.
11. Robert C. Post, “‘Liberalizers’ versus ‘Scientific Men’ in the Antebellum Patent
Office,” Technology and Culture 17 (January 1976): 24–54.
12. On regional perceptions of the patent system, see Ari Hoogenboom, The
Presidency of Rutherford B. Hayes (Lawrence, Kans., 1988), 117.
13. Usselman, Regulating Railroad Innovation, chap. 2.
14. Patent totals are taken from the patent commissioner’s annual reports, which
appeared annually in the congressional serial set. For the period discussed here, these
reports include only sketchy information about patents specific to railroads. For the 1852
STEVEN W. USSELMAN AND RICHARD R. JOHN 123
total, see Report of the Commissioner of Patents for 1852, 32d Cong., 2d sess., 1853, Sen. Ex.
Doc. 55, serial 667, 438. The total for 1865 appears in the Report of the Commissioner of
Patents for 1865, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, H. Ex. Doc. 52, serial 1257, 18.
15. The key cases are: Mowry v. Whitney, 14 Wall 620 (1872), reversing Whitney v.
Mowry, 29 F. Cas. 1105 (1870); Mevs v. Conover, 131 U.S. 142 (1877), affirming Conover v.
Mevs, 6 F. Cas. 322 (1868) and Conover v. Mevs, 11 Blachf. 197 (1873); and Cawood Patent,
94 U.S. 695, reversing in part Turrill v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, 24 F. Cas. 383
(C.C.N.D.Ill. 1867), 24 F. Cas. 385 (1871), and 24 F. Cas. 387 (1873).
16. Sayles v. Chicago and NW Ry Co., 21 F. Cas. 600 (1871). The case first came before
the federal district court in 1865 and reached the Supreme Court in 1878. Sayles v. Chicago
and NW Ry Co., 21 F. Cas. 597 (1865); Railway Company v. Sayles, 99 U.S. 554, 556–57
(1878). See also Arguments, 229; and John J. Harrower, History of the Eastern Railroad
Association (1905), 23, 29.
17. For the relevant cases, see note 15 above.
18. On the forty-year contest between the government and the railroads over safety
appliances, see Usselman, Regulating Railroad Innovation, chaps. 3, 8.
19. David O. Stowell, Streets, Railroads, and the Great Strike of 1877 (Chicago, 1999).
20. On Adams, see Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation (Cambridge, Mass.,
1984), chap. 1.
21. Charles W. McCurdy, “American Law and the Marketing Structure of the Large
Corporation, 1875–1890,” Journal of Economic History 38 (September 1978): 631–49;
Richard Franklin Bensel, The Political Economy of American Industrialization, 1877–1900
(New York, 2000), chap. 5.
22. On the Grangers’ hostility to Singer, see Hal Barron, Mixed Harvest: The Second
Great Transformation in the Rural North, 1870–1930 (Chapel Hill, 1997), 172. The Grangers
also supported state legislation to bar Singer agents from individual states. When the
Supreme Court declared this legislation unconstitutional, it greatly hastened the emer-
gence of national marketing networks. McCurdy, “American Law and the Marketing
Structure.”
23. Arguments, 438. The Senate bill, according to one newspaper account, should have
been enacted in March 1877, but it was “pushed over.” New York Times, 14 July 1878, 6.
24. Scientific American closely monitored legislative and judicial actions pertaining to
the patent system, while its editors frequently commented on major policy changes. For
the editors’ shifting analysis of the patent bill, see Scientific American: 17 March 1877, 36:
161, 15 December 1877, 37: 368, and 13 April 1878, 38: 224.
25. Innocent purchaser bills often found their way to the House; their deliberations
can be followed in the patent committee’s annual reports. On the bond cases, see Charles
Fairman, Reconstruction and Reunion, 1864–1888: History of the Supreme Court of the United
States, Part One (New York, 1971), chaps. 17, 18.
26. John G. Sproat, ‘The Best Men’: Liberal Reformers in the Gilded Age (New York,
1968). On the liberals, see, in addition to Sproat, David Montgomery, Beyond Equality:
Labor and the Radical Republicans, 1862–1872 (New York, 1967); William Gillette, Retreat
from Reconstruction, 1869–1879 (Baton Rouge, 1979); Michael McGerr, The Decline of
Popular Politics (New York, 1986); Eric Foner, Reconstruction (New York, 1988), chap. 10–12;
and Nancy Cohen The Reconstruction of American Liberalism, 1865–1914 (Chapel Hill, 2002).
On the enthusiasm of liberals for administrative expertise, see Thomas L. Haskell, The
Emergence of Professional Social Science: The American Social Science Association and the
Nineteenth-Century Crisis of Authority, rev. ed. (Baltimore, 2000 [1977]), and Stephen
Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative








33. Alfred R. Conkling, The Life and Letters of Roscoe Conkling, Orator, Statesman,
Advocate (New York, 1889), 491–93, 571–73.
34. Cong, Rec., 45th Cong., 3d sess., 15 January 1879, 8: 460.
35. Cong. Rec., 45th Cong., 3d sess., 17 January 1879, 8: 523.
36. Cong. Rec., 45th Cong., 3d sess., 19 December 1878, 8: 305.
37. For a survey of the tension between proprietary and corporate (or “capitalistic”)
values, see Tony A. Freyer, Producers versus Capitalists: Constitutional Conflict in Antebellum
America (Charlottesville, 1994).
38. The propensity of historians to exaggerate the corruption of post–Civil War pub-
lic figures such as Conkling is a recurrent theme of Mark Wahlgren Summers’s Era of Good
Stealings (New York, 1993). Conkling, Summers concluded, was as “personally honest” as
William H. Seward, though no less willing to “close an eye” to whatever “dirty deals” his
lieutenants back in New York might be orchestrating (28).
39. So long as Conkling remained in Congress, railroad magnate Collis Huntington
confided to his partners, he “would take nothing from us.” David J. Rothman, Politics and
Power: The United States Senate, 1869–1901 (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), 196–97. The extent
to which Conkling was less solicitous than Republican rivals to the railroads and other
organized economic interests was noted half a century ago by political historian Lee
Benson. For example, Conkling gave New York Central Railroad lobbyist Chauncey
Depew a “sharp going over” at the hearings of the Windom Committee in 1873—the first
hearings at which Congress considered the subject of railroad regulation in any detail.
Conkling remained antagonistic to the New York Central and other “corporate monopo-
lies” until his resignation from Congress in 1881. Lee Benson, Merchants, Farmers, and
Railroads: Railroad Regulation and New York Politics, 1850–1887 (Cambridge, Mass., 1955),
156–60. For a more skeptical view of Conkling’s relationship with corporations, see
Charles J. McClain, “From the Huntington Papers: The Huntington-Conkling
Connection,” Pacific Historian 29 (Winter 1985): 30–46, and Richard White,
“Information, Markets, and Corruption: Transcontinental Railroads in the Gilded Age,”
Journal of American History 90 (June 2003): 19–43.
40. Cong. Rec., 45th Cong., 3d sess., 24 January 1879, 8: 717, 723; 6 February 1879,
8:1069; 8 February 1879, 8: 1146; and 1 March 1879, 8: 2257–59. Conkling resigned from
the Senate shortly after the inauguration of President James K. Garfield in 1881 in a dis-
pute over patronage appointments in the New York Custom House. Conkling’s departure
has often been interpreted as the last gasp of a machine politician. Rothman, Politics and
Power, 32–35. Yet Conkling’s position on patent law suggests that his quarrel with the
Garfield administration might have extended to the “great commercial and industrial ques-
tions” that Garfield considered the real business of the day. Thompson, Spider’s Web, 113.
41. Robert P. Merges and Richard R. Nelson, “The Complex Economics of Patent
Scope,” Columbia Law Review 90 (1990): 839–916.
42. On Bradley’s tenure on the Supreme Court, see Charles Fairman, Reconstruction
and Reunion, whose analysis we follow closely here. See also Edward G. White, The
American Judicial Tradition: Profiles of Leading American Judges (New York, 1976), chap. 4.
43. Railroad Company v. Lockwood, 17 Wallace 357 (1873), and Railway Co. v. Stevens,
95 U.S. 655 (1878).
44. An analogous argument informed Bradley’s majority opinion in an influential
1879 copyright case, Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). Selden claimed that a book he had
copyrighted in 1859 covered the essential principles of the bookkeeping method it
described, and that subsequent books on the subject violated his copyright. Bradley ruled
that Selden’s book covered only the particular expression of his accounting method and
not the idea itself. By firmly upholding the dichotomy between an idea and its expression,
and by stressing the importance of empirically verifying the author’s claims, Bradley
extended to copyright law principles long central to patent litigation. “To give to the
STEVEN W. USSELMAN AND RICHARD R. JOHN 125
author of the book an exclusive property in the art described therein,” Bradley declared,
“when no examination of its novelty has ever been officially made, would be a surprise and
a fraud upon the public.” Quoted in Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs: The
Rise of Intellectual Property and How It Threatens Creativity (New York, 2001), 29–30.
45. Mitchell v. Tilghman, 19 Wallace 287 (1874).
46. Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1881).
47. Brown v. Selby, 21 Wallace 181 (1874).
48. Fairman, Reconstruction and Reunion, 122–23.
49. Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192 (1883), 199–200.
50. Annual Report of the Executive Committee of the Eastern Railroad Association 19
(1885): 16.
51. For a more extended discussion, see Usselman, Regulating Railroad Innovation,
chap. 5–7, 9.
52. On the rise of corporate industrial research, and the concomitant changes in
legal doctrine, see David F. Noble, America by Design: Science, Technology, and the Rise of
Corporate Capitalism (New York, 1977), esp. chap. 6, and David A. Hounshell, “Industrial
Research and Manufacturing Technology,” in Encyclopedia of the United States in the
Twentieth Century, ed. Stanley I. Kutler (New York, 1996), 2:831–57.
53. Martin J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890–1916:
The Market, the Law, and Politics (New York, 1988).
54. For a variety of perspectives on early twentieth-century state-building, see
Skowronek, Building a New American State; Morton Keller, Regulating a New Economy: Public
Policy and Economic Change in America, 1900–1933 (Cambridge, Mass., 1990); and Daniel P.
Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation
in Executive Agencies, 1862–1928 (Princeton, 2001).
55. For a related conclusion, see Allan G. Bogue, The Earnest Men: Republicans of the
Civil War Senate (Ithaca, 1981), 296. No one who has studied closely the public pro-
nouncements of mid-nineteenth-century senators, Bogue observed, can argue that they
“took their tasks and obligations lightly”: “Obviously, too, they attached considerable
importance to showing themselves to be consistent in their approach to specific issues.”
56. To emphasize the adversarial character of government-business relations in the
1870s calls into question the long-standing consensus of business historians that the so-
called “adversarial relationship” between government and business originated in the
period after 1880, and reached its peak in the period after 1900. For a convenient state-
ment of this thesis—which has long been associated with Alfred D. Chandler Jr.—see
Thomas K. McCraw, “Business and Government: The Origins of the Adversary
Relationship,” California Management Review 26 (Winter 1984): 33–52, esp. 39–41.
57. On the continuing involvement in patent issues of the Eastern Railroad
Association, see Usselman, Regulating Railroad Innovation, chap. 4. On the growing legiti-
macy of organized groups in the framing of public policy, see Elisabeth S. Clemens, The
People’s Lobby: Organizational Innovation and the Rise of Interest Group Politics in the United
States, 1890–1925 (Chicago, 1997).
